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FOURTH REVIEW CONFERENCE OF THE PARTIES TO THE TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

COMMITTEE I

PROVISIONAL SUMMARY RECORD OF THE 2nd MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Monday, 27 August 1990, at 10 a.m.

Chairman: Mr. ADEYEMI (Nigeria)

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The meeting was called to order at 10.20 a.m.

ORGANIZATION OF WORK (NPT/CONF.IV/MC.I/Dec.1)

The CHAIRMAN thanked the Committee for electing him and said that a record of the decisions on the programme of work had been prepared at the request of the delegation of New Zealand and circulated as document NPT/CONF.IV/MC.I/Dec.1. He intended to convene an informal meeting of friends of the Chairman, to begin as soon as the current meeting rose, in order to consider the programme, including the mandates of the sub-committee and of any working groups that might be required.

GENERAL EXCHANGE OF VIEWS ON AGENDA ITEMS ALLOCATED TO THE COMMITTEE (NPT/CONF.IV/17; NPT/CONF.IV/L.1; NPT/CONF.IV/MC.I/CRP.1)

The CHAIRMAN invited members to engage in a general exchange of views on the review of the operation of the Treaty as provided for in article VIII (3), pursuant to Conference agenda item 13 A and B. Only the present meeting was available for such an exchange and he urged speakers to be brief and to avoid repetition of statements made in plenary.

The Committee's work was vital and the task was to seek to strengthen the Treaty with a view to achieving broader adherence and improving the possibility of extending it indefinitely beyond 1995. In that regard, a unique opportunity was offered by the vastly improved international political climate and the upsurge in optimism and the will to co-operate. The Treaty was imperfect, of course, especially in its lack of credible guarantees and commitment to disarmament measures, not to mention the question of nuclear transfers. Again, the issues before the Committee were sensitive and complex. Members should show the utmost flexibility and a spirit of compromise. He hoped that specific proposals would be put forward in the form of draft texts so worded as to attract the widest possible support.

Mrs. THEORIN (Sweden) said that the United Nations Group of Experts on a Comprehensive Study on Nuclear Weapons, which she had chaired, had adopted its report by consensus. The Secretary-General was to transmit the study to the General Assembly at its forty-fifth session, and the text was available to the Conference as an informal paper. The adoption by consensus was in itself a significant achievement, in view of the scope and complexity of the subject; it had also been very timely, having taken place one month after an agreement, signed at the recent summit meeting in Washington,

which provided for deep cuts in various categories in the strategic offensive arms of the United States and the Soviet Union, continued negotiations on further cuts and effective limitations on qualitative improvements in strategic and tactical nuclear weapons. Coincidentally, on the day the report had been adopted the Heads of State and Government of the NATO countries had announced a major shift in military doctrine.

The study was the first United Nations study in the field of security to be completed in the new period of détente between East and West, and the first in which nuclear-weapon States had taken part. It had responded to the need to update and supplement, in the light of changes in the world political situation and developments in science and nuclear-weapon technology, the United Nations study submitted to the General Assembly in 1980. The report provided technical data and statistics on existing nuclear weapons, reviewed developments in nuclear-weapon systems, analysed doctrines and strategies, described weapons development, production and testing as well as the effects of nuclear warfare, commented on matters such as international security, arms limitation and disarmament, examined the legality of nuclear weapons and outlined a set of political conclusions. It had been able to show, thanks to the current climate of glasnost, data from the Soviet Union on matters such as birth defects and mortality rates from leukaemia in the Semipalatinsk region, where there was a Soviet nuclear test site. Nuclear weapons, even if not used, involved a high price for human beings and for the environment. For example, a $28.6 billion programme was proposed by the United States Department of Energy to rectify conditions at civil and military nuclear sites, clean up pollution and develop new methods for radioactive and chemical waste disposal.

The study's conclusions pointed to the entire world's conviction of the catastrophic consequences of a major nuclear war, referred to the nuclear-weapon Powers' determination, voiced during the past decade, to avoid any nuclear conflict, and stressed that not only those Powers, but other States also, should contribute to reducing the risk of nuclear war. The study noted the momentous world changes, including the progress in disarmament negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union, which had reduced the threat of nuclear confrontation, and stressed the right and duty of States to help in disarmament efforts. Strict observance of the nuclear non-proliferation régime remained fundamentally important, and global and

regional efforts were needed to strengthen the régime further in all its aspects. The study ended on an optimistic note, postulating that reliance on military strength for national security would be increasingly supplemented by policies of confidence-building and co-operation - doubtless the trend over the long term.

It was her hope that the study would become a standard reference work, available to experts and laymen throughout the world, on the nuclear disarmament issues of the 1990s, and that it would prove useful to the Conference, which had the task, inter alia, of preparing for an extension of the NPT in 1995.

Mr. GUTIERREZ (Peru) said there were a number of issues which should be reflected in the Final Document so as to mark some progress in relation to the one adopted in 1985, and one of them was vertical proliferation. Although the strategic arms limitation negotiations between the super-Powers, signified progress in quantitative terms, technological research was continuing. Hence, a clear statement by the nuclear-weapon States of their intention to comply with the obligation under article VI to end the arms race should be accompanied by an unequivocal statement of the intention to proceed to a corresponding qualitative limitation.

Horizontal proliferation, too, was a cause for concern. In the past five years, transfers to States not Parties to the NPT of material and technology for nuclear-weapon development, including the means to manufacture ballistic missiles and launch vehicles, had been on the increase. To put an end to that utterly objectionable practice, the Conference should, in line with the obligations set out in article I of the Treaty, arrive at an undertaking by all producer countries of relevant equipment or technology that they would demand, as a general rule, the "full-scope safeguards" from importers in all countries not Parties to the NPT. The safeguards should also be made applicable to all cases of supplies under existing contracts. It was to be hoped that an appropriate code of conduct, which some producer countries already intended to apply, could be adopted for acceptance by all NPT Parties and set forth in the Conference's Final Document. His delegation would revert to that matter during discussions on article III (2). The Final Document should also contain an urgent appeal for all non-nuclear-weapon Parties to the NPT to sign as speedily as possible the relevant IAEA safeguards agreement, pursuant to the provisions of article III (1).

Under article I, nuclear-weapon States Parties undertook not to transfer to anyone, directly or indirectly, nuclear weapons or explosive devices or help any non-nuclear-weapon State to manufacture or acquire them. In order to strengthen that undertaking, a legally binding policy statement to that effect should be made by all nuclear-weapon States. Peru also endorsed the initiative aimed at requiring all non-nuclear-weapon States not (Parties) to the NPT to assume a legal undertaking not to acquire nuclear weapons or explosive devices and to accept the IAEA safeguards for all their current and future nuclear activity.

As to the link between the NPT with cessation of nuclear testing and with a treaty on the total prohibition of such tests, it would be desirable to negotiate, among other options, a treaty on a comprehensive nuclear test ban, as a possible temporary measure, valid for 10 years perhaps during which period the nuclear-weapon testing States would undertake to adopt the necessary measures towards total cessation. The process could begin with the nuclear-weapon States Parties to the NPT, be extended to all States possessing nuclear weapons or devices and finally lead to a multilateral agreement.

Negative security assurances were an important complementary element, but had been widely and wrongly ignored. An agreement should be drawn up at once, legally requiring any nuclear-weapon State to avoid the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against any non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the NPT. His delegation supported most of the contents of document NPT/CONF.IV/17, containing the Nigerian proposal, but felt that a detailed analysis was warranted in order to align some of the matters with the requirements of the States Parties. It was ready to work to that end in the sub-committee to consider negative assurances. A further confidence-building measure would be a joint declaration, by all nuclear-weapon States, that none would be the first to use weapons of that type.

Despite a <u>de facto</u> moratorium on the production of fissionable material on account of the huge stockpiles in the hands of the nuclear-weapon States, none of those States had voiced a decision to suspend production. Therefore, negotiations must be initiated on an agreement for international verificaion of a complete end to such production; such a measure would accord fully with bilateral understandings on the reduction of intermediate-range and strategic nuclear weapons and therefore be consonant with article VI of the NPT.

In view of the welcome outcome of the recent talks between the United States and the Soviet Union on a substantial reduction in strategic nuclear weapons, it would be a valuable further step towards compliance with article VI if the super-Powers could formally announce, at the present Conference, an undertaking to draw up a strategic arms limitation agreement during 1990 and to begin START II negotiations as speedily as possible.

The views expressed during the current exchange could perhaps be issued as preliminary texts which, together with working papers submitted by delegations or groups, might serve as a basis for the Committee contribution to the Final Document. His delegation reiterated its readiness to co-operate fully to that end.

Mr. MARIN BOSCH (Mexico) thanked the representative of Sweden for the information about the comprehensive study on nuclear weapons conducted by the United Nations Group of Experts. Since the previous Review Conference a number of significant developments had made the intervening period the most hopeful since the era of détente had begun. Yet there was no sign of the political will to arrive at an agreement on a total comprehensive nuclear-weapon test ban, the lack of which remained an obstacle to full compliance with the spirit and the letter of the NPT. The United States and the United Kingdom together with their NATO partners, insisted that continuance of nuclear testing was essential in order, as they put it, to maintain deterrent credibility. It was hard to see who needed to be deterred, now that the Cold War and confrontation had disappeared. Despite the negotiations for the cuts in strategic arsenals, the withdrawal of intermediate-range weapons from European territory and the possible reduction of short-range weapons there, it seemed that nuclear warheads were being repositioned in other regions or at sea. The nuclear threat, therefore, had not disappeared. Nuclear disarmament and an end to the nuclear arms race would never be achieved while the testing and production of fissionable material for military purposes continued.

His delegation attached the greatest importance to article VI, which was based on the text of a Mexican initiative put forward in 1966, and fully supported the draft resolution contained in document NPT/CONF.IV/L.1, submitted by the Non-Aligned and Other States. The proposals it contained were aimed at strengthening the NPT and ensuring that it remained fully operative beyond 1995. In particular, he supported the call, set out in

detail in operative paragraph 4, for action by the Governments of the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States. The Committee's deliberations and drafting work must be systematic and orderly, so as to make a valid contribution to the Final Document of the Conference. Mexico's proposals to that end were contained in working paper NPT/CONF.IV/MC.I/CRP.1. The text was self-explanatory, and he would welcome any comments.

Mr. AALBU (Norway) said that the terms of articles I and II were central to the aim of preventing further proliferation of nuclear weapons. The possibility that non-nuclear-weapon States had already acquired nuclear weapon capability or might be trying to do so was a particularly great danger in regions where tension and conflict posed a threat to international peace and security. The Nordic Governments had therefore suggested that all non-nuclear-weapon States not Parties to the Treaty should assume international, legally binding commitments not to acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, and no effort should be spared to secure universal adherence to the Treaty.

As to article VI, the Final Document should record that considerably more progress had taken place during the period under review than in any previous period and that prospects for further progress were good. Nevertheless, only limited progress had been made in regard to a total and permanent ban on all nuclear explosions. A multilateral agreement on a comprehensive nuclear test ban was vital in securing effective control over nuclear weapons development and proliferation. Therefore, the present Conference should strongly advocate that the recently re-established ad hoc committee in the Conference on Disarmament should initiate substantive work when it resumed its deliberations in 1991. The Final Document should also reflect the environmental concerns voiced in regard to underground nuclear testing.

The establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones was an important supplement to the NPT. The initiative must come from the States of the regions concerned and the zones established must not adversely affect existing security arrangements. All the major States of the region in question must be parties, and adequate verification arrangements must exist. Such zones had been established in Latin America and the South Pacific and had contributed to the global efforts to halt and reverse the arms race. However, it was important that all eligible States should beqome parties to such a treaty.

Mr. DONOWAKI (Japan) said that all States Parties should abide by the provisions of articles I and II. Doubts of any kind - and some had been raised, unfortunately - about the implementation of those articles would damage the Treaty's credibility. It would be advisable, therefore, for States Parties, nuclear and non-nuclear, to reaffirm their strict observance of the provisions of those articles. Non-nuclear-weapon States which had not yet acceded to the Treaty should be encouraged to do so. Japan, which shared the concerns expressed about those States, had approached 18 of them shortly before the start of the Conference.

With regard to article VI and preambular paragraphs 8 to 12, it was fair to acknowledge the progress made during the past five years, far more than in the previous 15 years, in the nuclear-weapon States' nuclear disarmament efforts. Yet the Conference should also request further efforts in that direction. Nor should the obligation of non-nuclear States Parties to pursue general and complete disarmament be overlooked. Despite the encouraging CFE and CSCE negotiations and the progress in chemical weapon negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament, more efforts were obviously required to dispel the danger of armed conflict in some regions, exemplified by the mounting crisis of the past few weeks. Preambular paragraph 11 of the Treaty specifically referred to the States Parties' desire to further the easing of international tension and the strengthening of trust between States. In some regions where disarmament efforts were not ripe for negotiation, political efforts might have to be given priority in order to ease tension and build confidence.

His delegation endorsed the welcome of the re-establishment, in the Conference on Disarmament, of the Ad hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban, and hoped that it would be convened as early as possible at that Conference's 1991 session. A step-by-step approach was the shortest and most realistic way to achieve a comprehensive test ban. Japan intended to participate actively in the PTBT Amendment Conference to be convened in January 1991. It understood the non-nuclear-weapon States Parties' security concerns and agreed that a solution should be sought through in-depth dialogue between nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States within the NPT régime. The Review Conference was one of the best forums for consideration of the problem, but in view of the complex practical aspects the dialogue might have to be pursued in the Conference on Disarmament or other appropriate United Nations forums.

Mr. KRALIK (Czech and Slovak Federal Republic) said the President of his country, Mr. Vaclav Havel, had said recently, when addressing the Council of Europe, that the former totalitarian grip on Central and Eastern European nations had forced them to pay a high price for a security system based on fear of nuclear weapons. Those countries now realized that their common living space had thereby been deformed, and required a new system of security, an inseparable part of which must be the nuclear non-proliferation régime, at least until all nuclear weapons had been eliminated. Each signatory therefore had a grave responsibility not only to abide passively by the Treaty's separate provisions but actively to give effect to the non-proliferation régime and the process of nuclear arms control and disarmament.

However, the "nuclear market" was liable to make proliferation a major problem of the 1990s, involving not only nuclear arms but chemical weapons, missile equipment and nuclear technology. Hence, complementary, verifiable political and technical measures should be adopted at the national and the international level, to prevent the transfer of weapons and technology usable in the nuclear field. His delegation endorsed the conclusions of the Zangger Group in that regard. Accession to the Treaty by all nuclear-weapon States would, of course, considerably enhance the non-proliferation régime, by strengthening international legal obligations that no proclamations by non-Party nuclear-weapon States could replace.

The review of article VI focused particularly on nuclear-weapon States. Although implementation of its provisions was still not fully satisfactory, there had been more progress since the previous Review Conference than in all the preceding years; that dynamic atmosphere was propitious for the step-by-step solution exemplified by the signing of the INF Treaty in 1978, something which had shown that even highly complex problems could be solved given the political will, and by the fact that negotiations for START II had already led to the elaboration of 12 verification methods. Such sound progress augured well for further strengthening of the Treaty.

Negative security assurances were an important part of the arms reduction process, since further countries would accede to the Treaty only if they were convinced of its utility. The existing assurances were not unified, however, and some were inadequate for non-nuclear-weapon States.

Nuclear disarmament was inseparable from the disarmament process as a whole, and the comprehensive banning of nuclear-weapon tests was inseparable from the issue of non-proliferation. The committee for that purpose in

the Conference on Disarmament had been re-established, and a Partial Test Ban Treaty Amendment Conference would be convened in January 1991. A complete global ban on nuclear tests was a key factor for strengthening the NPT and achieving nuclear arms reduction and disarmament.

Responsibility for implementing the Treaty lay with nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States Parties alike, bearing in mind the Treaty's importance for the future, for the Treaty should prevail over military ambition and force.

Mr. AZIKIWE (Nigeria), referring to the question of security assurances, said that what had, for two decades, been a legitimate concern for the security of non-nuclear-weapon States Parties to the NPT had gradually become more associated with the nuclear-weapon States' security. It was curious, too, that the provision of negative security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States not Parties to the NPT continued to be advocated by certain interest groups, at the Conference on Disarmament and in other forums, as a precondition for any progress on that issue. The subject had first been broached when non-aligned countries had specifically sought assurances that the renunciation of nuclear weapons would not place them at a permanent military disadvantage and render them vulnerable to nuclear intimidation. However, the potential disadvantage feared at the time had increased several-fold. Nigeria had observed all too often that unilateral declarations in that regard by various nuclear-weapon States helped only to the extent that they expressed those States' concerns. Although they might assist in negotiations, unilateral assurances alone could not constitute firm, credible and legally-binding agreements; they were un-negotiated, unverifiable, conflicting, contradictory and subject to divergent interpretations. Yet no real progress had been made in that regard since the Third Review Conference, for the nuclear-weapon States clung to their unilateral declarations, acting solely in their narrow security interests and disregarding the non-nuclear-weapon States' security concerns, thus producing a stalemate on that item at the Conference on Disarmament.

Insistence on unilateral negative security assurances introduced an unacceptable element, akin to blackmail, into multilateral disarmament negotiations. To suggest that States which had made a legally-binding commitment to relinquish the nuclear option should be content with such unilateral assurances was to undermine their sovereignty; to insist on

unconditional assurances, thus placing parties and non-parties on the same footing, was unrealistic, unfruitful and disruptive. Negative security assurances must be effectively negotiated, in the light of current security realities. Until nuclear disarmament - the most effective assurance - was achieved, it was imperative for the international community to develop effective negative security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States.

Against that background, Nigeria had submitted a proposal, in 1987, in which non-nuclear-weapon States were classified according to their security situations, the purpose being to enhance negotiations. The nuclear-weapon States had preferred their unilateral declarations, and some non-nuclear-weapon States which had not renounced the nuclear option had remained unco-operative. Nor did a further proposal by Nigeria, in 1988, under which nuclear-weapon States would relinquish their unilateral declarations during the negotiating process, succeeded in breaking the stalemate.

To strengthen the NPT and allay the anxiety of some non-nuclear-weapon States Parties, and provide further incentive to non-Party States to accede to the Treaty, Nigeria had submitted a draft agreement, contained in document NPT/CONF.IV/17, on negative security assurances within the framework of the NPT. His delegation welcomed the support expressed by nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States Parties, and would speak again on the matter when it was taken up in the appropriate Sub-Committee, in the hope that the proposal could be adopted during the Review Conference. On that subject, his country believed that Security Council resolution 255 (1968), on Positive Security Assurances was inadequate and that unilateral declarations, having played no credible role in regard to negative assurances, should not be commended in the Final Document.

The current political developments in South Africa should not make for a false sense of security, since South Africa's nuclear-weapon capability was incompatible with peace and security for the world in general and the African States in particular. Since 1987 South Africa had been voicing its intention to accede to the NPT; it should take immediate action accordingly and submit all its nuclear activity to IAEA full scope safeguards.

Mr. TALIANI (Italy) said that one specific problem arising from the welcome progress being made in nuclear disarmament was the reconversion of weapons-grade fissionable material that became available following the decommissioning of nuclear weapons. Such material should be reassigned for

peaceful purposes, particularly for the benefit of developing countries, under appropriate international supervision. Italy had drafted a text - unfortunately not yet available for circulation - on that issue. It wished to propose some wording for inclusion in the Final Document and would speak on the matter later.

Italy's position on a comprehensive test-ban treaty was well known. In view of the current progress towards nuclear disarmament, exemplified by the intention declared by the United States and the Soviet Union to reduce their IBMs by 50 per cent, the time was perhaps not ripe for a decision on the CTB issue, as could be seen from the outcome of the latest session of the Committee on Disarmament. It was possible that, in five years' time, the problem might have disappeared.

Mr. REESE (Australia) said that, although the previous Review Conference had deemed that articles I and II were fully implemented, since then the failure of States with significant nuclear capability to fulfil their obligations to complete their safeguards agreements, and clandestine attempts by some non-nuclear-weapon States Parties to procure certain questionable items, gave rise to doubts. His delegation hoped that the Final Document would mention that it was important for Parties to adhere, and be seen to adhere, to the Treaty obligations. Moreover, and in regard to preambular paragraphs 1 to 3, which were of central importance to the NPT, the wording should be stronger than it had been in the Final Document of the previous Review Conference.

Article VI and preambular paragraphs 8 to 12 related essentially to the other half of the bargain struck in acceding to the NPT: the commitment to nuclear disarmament. In that context, Australia welcomed the improved political climate and the resultant enhanced prospects for nuclear and conventional disarmament. It supported the range of arms control negotiations, especially START, between the United States and the Soviet Union and looked forward to the conclusion of an agreement which would drastically reduce their arsenals. However, as the Australian Foreign Minister had pointed out during the general debate the number of nuclear weapons in the world would still be unacceptably high. His delegation therefore reiterated its conviction that nuclear disarmament must be pursued, actively and in good faith, pursuant to article VI, while recognizing that the process would be slow and complex and that, as noted at the previous Review Conference, stability was important.

A comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty remained an urgent priority, since the limits it would impose on proliferation, vertical and horizontal, made it an integral part of the nuclear disarmament process and thus of full implementation of the NPT. Although the agreements signed, since the previous Review Conference, by the United States and the Soviet Union on the Verification Protocol of the 1974 Threshold Test-Ban Treaty and the 1976 Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty were welcome and should be acknowledged in the Final Document, a comprehensive test ban was some way off. It was gratifying to see the recent re-establishment, in the Conference on Disarmament, of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban, for it was time for the international community to begin work towards the early conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty. Although Australia had doubts about the Partial Test-Ban Treaty Amendment Conference, it would participate in it constructively. Whatever the Conference's findings with regard to testing, the NPT remained essential.

With regard to article VII, Australia's involvement in the negotiation and establishment of the South Pacific Nuclear-Free Zone reflected its view that, in appropriate circumstances, such a zone could make a major contribution to regional security and global disarmament efforts. China and the Soviet Union had since signed the relevant Protocols to the Treaty of Rarotonga, and the members of the South Pacific Forum continued to urge other nuclear-weapon States to do so. The text of that Treaty would shortly be circulated and it was to be hoped that all delegations would support its inclusion in the Final Document.

Negative security assurances played a fundamental role in a treaty in which the vast majority of the States Parties had relinquished the option of nuclear weapons. His delegation looked forward to participating in the sub-committee to be established to consider proposals such as those submitted by Nigeria and Egypt relating to a legal system of such assurances. In that connection, under Protocol 2 of the Treaty of Rarotonga, the signatories were legally bound to give negative security assurances.

Since the NPT still lacked universality, the Conference's Final Document should issue a strong appeal to all States not yet Parties to reconsider their position. Non-Party States did gain de facto security benefits from the Treaty while accepting none of its obligations, and hence means must be sought to show them sound reasons for joining. Increased membership, particularly by the so-called "threshold States", would help in the negotiations to extend the Treaty indefinitely beyond 1995.

Mr. GORDON (United States of America) said that his delegation would work towards producing a consensus document, which could be achieved given goodwill and a spirit of co-operation. At the same time, efforts must be concentrated on establishing a sound basis for 1995, which meant that the NPT régime must be strengthened, not threatened or jeopardized in any way.

Satisfaction could be recorded with regard to article 1, but the implementation of article II needed to be strengthened, through scrupulous adherence by all Parties.

Article VI applied not just to nuclear-weapon States but to all countries, and involved non-nuclear as well as nuclear arms control negotiations. The United States had an impressive record of arms control negotiations and activities, nuclear and non-nuclear, which spoke for itself and testified to article VI's viability, yet it was time for the international community to demand that all Parties should make commensurate efforts to achieve arms control measures that could ease regional tensions and abate regional arms competition. The Conference should send a strong message to all States Parties accordingly. Fulfilment of article VI's objectives should not be judged solely in terms of the agreements concluded, for the article dealt with a process which was, in and of itself, of the utmost importance. It was also essential to recognize that changing political relationships affected arms control and disarmament measures and vice versa, and that particular arms control measures themselves, such as deep cuts in arsenals, required very careful attention in regard to the type and reliability of the weapons remaining. To avoid instability, reductions must be designed to maintain balanced defensive capability at every phase. Again, at every stage of reduction, the ability to test was essential. It must be recognized that nuclear arsenal reductions of the type sought in the START negotiations depended on awareness that the remaining weapons could be stored, deployed or transported safely and would perform as designed - which meant the ability to test. The United States was committed to an eventual complete ban on testing, on a step-by-step basis. The conditions it imposed were based on the conviction that disregard for the relationship between the types of weapons remaining at any time, or their reliability, would be a seriously destabilizing factor.

In order to strengthen the Treaty, efforts must be made to attract States currently outside its régime. Nor must the Treaty be held hostage to the conclusion of any particular treaty, whether on banning, on reduction or on

test limitations. Every arms control measure that contributed towards general and complete disarmament, the goal of article VI, must be considered and pursued on its own merits. The United States could not agree that a comprehensive test ban was a sine qua non for extending the NPT. As a matter of procedure, the United States rejected that form of hostage-holding just as it rejected any other form. As a matter of substance, it pledged itself, and called upon others, to keep the arms control process moving ahead on a smooth, steady course.

Mr. CHIRILA (Romania) said his delegation attached great importance to the re-establishment, at the Conference on Disarmament, of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban. It had also welcomed the way in which informal meetings had been held at that Conference, such as those relating to items 2 and 3 of its agenda, at which the delegations of the Soviet Union and the United States had reported on their bilateral negotiations on strategic and outer space weapons, and the discussions which had followed. That practice of interrelating current multilateral and bilateral efforts should be encouraged. As to security arrangements for non-nuclear-weapon States, the relevant committee had noted, in its report, the many recent political improvements whose effects should have a bearing on the search for possible solutions. The proposals and initiatives put forward at the Conference on Disarmament as well as those prepared by the Nigerian and other delegations in the preparations for the current Review Conference, should be viewed in the overall context of efforts to arrive at a common formula.

His delegation had listened with interest to the information provided by the representative of Sweden about the United Nations Group of Experts on a Comprehensive Study on Nuclear Weapons, and had noted not only the progress made, including the greater transparency which prevailed, but also the various concerns still being voiced, particularly in regard to the qualitative aspects of nuclear weapons.

Delegations should now make every effort to reach conclusions in a spirit of consensus; his own would heed the Chairman's remarks in that regard and co-operate to the utmost.

Mr. HARUN-UR-RASHID (Bangladesh) said that the NPT was widely viewed as one of the most important agreements in the field of arms control and disarmament, but it was intended only as a means to achieve the goals reflected in its provisions and in preambular paragraphs 8, 10 and 11. If the NPT régime was to be strengthened, five conditions were essential: scrupulous

adherence by all States Parties to their treaty obligations, particularly the provisions of articles I, II and III; disarmament obligation; security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States; the peaceful application and transfer of nuclear technology, particularly to developing States Parties to the NPT; and full-scope safeguards for all nuclear activity.

The wording of article VI made its purpose very clear: cessation of the nuclear arms race, as well as nuclear and comprehensive disarmament. In that regard, his delegation welcomed the many recent positive steps such as the progress in the various arms control negotiations and measures undertaken by the Soviet Union and the United States, and the re-establishment, in the Conference on Disarmament, of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban. A comprehensive test ban was crucial to fulfilment of the Treaty obligations; it was not in itself a substantive disarmament measure but only a prelude. In that connection, all aspects of disarmament, particularly nuclear disarmament pursuant to the terms of article VI, were contained in draft resolution NPT/CONF.IV/L.1.

Legally binding negative security assurances for non-nuclear weapon States were an imperative need but Security Council resolution 255 (1968) provided no commitment or obligation beyond those already contained in the Charter. On that point, his delegation would state its views during the deliberations on the proposals put forward by the delegations of Egypt and Nigeria.

Bangladesh supported the concept of regional nuclear-weapon-free zones and recognized the regional treaties already concluded as positive developments. He was confident that the Committee would achieve success in its work.

Mr. WAYARABI (Indonesia) said it was clear that some articles of the NPT were being implemented and others were not. For example, article I had been observed as far as the letter, but not as far as the spirit was concerned. It was also generally recognized that the nuclear-weapon States Parties had been unable fully to implement the provisions of article VI and preambular paragraphs 8 to 12, in sad contrast to the fact that the non-nuclear-weapon States Parties had fully discharged their obligations under article II. Therefore, the factors which prevented States Parties from wholly implementing the provisions of the Treaty, and more especially of the articles in question, should be reviewed regularly if the Treaty's credibility was to be enhanced.

Article VI made it clear that all Parties must discharge their obligation to pursue negotiations in good faith. Hence, he could not share some delegations' interpretation that the NPT was but an instrument to encourage negotiations on nuclear and non-nuclear weapons control. Indonesia also found it disquieting that the nuclear-weapon States' perceived strategic concepts meant that the reduction in the number of nuclear weapons was accompanied by further developments in the quality and reliability of those that remained - in pursuit of policies which amounted to double standards and a threat to the Treaty.

Regional nuclear-weapon-free zones, freely arrived at, promoted regional stability and security, thus contributing to the efforts to attain the NPT's goals. The ASEAN countries were intensifying their efforts to establish such a zone. It was hoped that all countries, especially nuclear-weapon States, with interests in such regions would accede to and respect the international instruments that had established nuclear-weapon-free zones and support the initiatives taken by States Parties in accordance with article VII of the Treaty, as called for in draft resolution NPT/CONF.IV/L.1.

The most effective safeguard against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons would be nuclear disarmament and complete elimination of nuclear weapons. It was to be hoped that, until that goal could be attained, all nuclear-weapon States would give an unconditional guarantee not to use, or threaten to use, such weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States. Accordingly, his delegation could support a proposal, on the lines put forward by the delegations of Egypt and Nigeria, to convene a conference on such assurances no later than 1991. Separate assurances by individual nuclear-weapon States were not enough at the present stage. In his opinion, the current world political climate was conducive to a start on negotiations towards an agreement on that issue.

Mr. PALIHAKKARA (Sri Lanka), referring to article VI, said that he welcomed the recent progress in bilateral negotiations, which contrasted with the overall lack of progress prior to the previous Review Conference. Nevertheless, it was disappointing that no effective limitations had been agreed upon in connection with the qualitative development of nuclear weapons systems, despite specific calls voiced at the previous Review. It was a matter for concern that, despite the deep cuts in strategic arsenals foreseen in the START negotiations, 20 per cent more nuclear weapons would be deployed than had been the case in 1970. As shown in the recent comprehensive study by

the United Nations Group of Experts, continued modernization would lead to the deployment of new types of weapons systems, contrary to the purposes of article VII of the NPT.

A comprehensive test-ban treaty would be a vital step towards non-proliferation, but no tangible move towards negotiating a treaty was being made. The argument that continued testing was necessary to ensure the safety of the remaining weapons was not backed by the published data, which indicated that the main considerations were further development, rather than safety. His delegation therefore deemed a comprehensive test-ban treaty an important concomitant to article VI and was disturbed at the lack of any clear commitment to resume even the non-negotiating work undertaken by the Conference on Disarmament in that regard. It also shared the concern voiced about the hazards, confirmed by new evidence, from underground nuclear testing. Testing of that kind, and the continued production of nuclear weapons material, would, if unchecked, result in the need for enormous expenditure on environmental safety.

Equally disquieting was the lack of progress towards meeting the non-nuclear-weapon States' legitimate demands for effective security assurances; the nuclear-weapon States should not continue to avoid addressing such genuine concerns. Perhaps they would be more amenable, at the present Conference, to seeking a workable solution. A number of constructive proposals had been made and should be considered constructively. In that connection, draft resolution NPT/CONF.IV/L.1 deserved the Committee's serious consideration.

The meeting rose at 12.30 p.m.